The Humanitarian Doctrine in Missouri by Gaines, Arthur C.
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 20 Issue 2 
January 1935 
The Humanitarian Doctrine in Missouri 
Arthur C. Gaines 
St. Louis Bar Association 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Arthur C. Gaines, The Humanitarian Doctrine in Missouri, 20 ST. LOUIS L. REV. 113 (1935). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol20/iss2/1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
HUMANITARIAN DOCTRINE IN MISSOURI
THE HUMANITARIAN DOCTRINE IN MISSOURI
BY ARTHUR C. GAINES
I. INTRODUCTORY
Channing Pollock, American playwright and sentimentalist,
once referred to the efforts of his contemporaries in the field of
the drama as "a grand conglomeration of garbled verbiage and
verbal garbage." The applicability of this description to the in-
terpretations of the humanitarian doctrine as it exists in Mis-
souri is somewhat pronounced.
In order to come to a better understanding of the humani-
tarian doctrine it will be wise to turn back to the English case
of Butterfield v. Forrester' decided by Lord Ellenborough in the
Court of King's Bench in 1809, in which case the general rule
as to contributory negligence was first distinctly announced. This
was an action on the case for obstruction of an highway, by
means of which obstruction the plaintiff was injured while riding
on his horse. The obstruction blocked but one side of the high-
way, and the plaintiff; who was riding fast and in the dark,
failed to see the clear passage. Lord Ellenborough declared that
two things contributed equally to the accident and the plaintiff's
resultant injury: (1) the obstruction in the road by fault of the
defendant; and (2) the want of ordinary care on the part of the
plaintiff to avoid it. Hence the rule was established that although
a defendant may have failed to exercise ordinary care, still a
plaintiff will not be entitled to recover damages, if he did not
use ordinary care for the safety of his own person and property,
and if such lack of care contributed proximately to the injury
complained of.2
Thirty-three years later, in England, the famous "donkey
case," Davies v. Mann,3 was decided by Lord Abinger in the Court
of Exchequer. The plaintiff in that case had negligently fettered
his donkey in the highway, so that the animal could not get out
of the way of passing vehicles. The defendant, while driving a
wagon in the street, negligently ran down and killed the plain-
tiff's donkey. It was held by the Court of Exchequer that the
1 11 East 60, 103 Eng. Rep. R. 926.
2 Beach, The Law of Contributory Negligence (2nd Ed. 1892) p. 10; Com-
ment 7 St. Louis Law Review 189.
3 (1842) 10 Mees & W. 546, 152 Eng. Reprint 588.
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plaintiff was entitled to recover on the theory that although the
plaintiff may be guilty of negligence tending to produce the in-
jury complained of, he may, nevertheless, recover damages for
the injury, if the defendant could, in spite of such negligence, by
the exercise of ordinary care upon his part have avoided inflict-
ing the injury.
Obviously the two cases are contrary to each other. Applying
the simple doctrine of Butterfield v. Forrester to the factual set-
up in Davies v. Mann, a court could do but one thing-give judg-
ment for the defendant. The two cases have, however, marched
along together down the decades of legal history, and their doc-
trines exist today-sometimes so distorted by ramifications and
exceptions as hardly to be recognizable.
The case of Davies v. Mann established what is now known as
the last clear chance doctrine. This rule has been set out by Judge
Cooley in the following manner: "If, therefore, the defendant
discovered the negligence of the plaintiff in time, by the use of
ordinary care, to prevent the injury, and did not make use of
such care for that purpose, he is justly charged with reckless
injury, and cannot rely upon the negligence of the plaintiff as a
protection. Or it may be said that in such a case the negligence
of the plaintiff only put him in a position of danger and was,
therefore, only the remote cause of the injury, while the subse-
quently intervening negligence of the defendant was the proxi-
mate cause. The rule is frequently spoken of as the doctrine of
the last clear chance, which is that the one who has the last clear
chance to avoid the injury and fails to do so is solely responsible
for its happening, as his negligence is the proximate cause of the
same." ' This doctrine of the last clear chance was adopted in
Missouri.,
The so-called humanitarian doctrine is a direct outgrowth of
the doctrine of the last clear chance. Some courts recognize no
distinction between the two. The difference seems to be that
under the last clear chance doctrine, as enunciated above, the
negligent plaintiff can recover when the defendent saw the plain-
tiff and then negligently failed to avoid the injury, while under
the humanitarian doctrine a duty is imposed on the defendant
to see the plaintiff, and if he could, by the exercise of ordinary
4 Cooley, Law of Torts (Throck. Ed. 1930), pp. 649-650.5 Burham v. St. Louis & I. M. R. R. Co. (1874) 56 Mo. 338.
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care have seen the plaintiff in a position of peril, yet failed to
do so, the defendant is nevertheless liable.8
Another striking distinction is that under the doctrine of the
last clear chance is implied the cessation of negligence on the
part of the plaintiff, and the commencement or continuation
thereof on the part of the defendant; while under the humani-
tarian doctrine it makes no difference whether the plaintiff's
negligence ceases or continues up to the time of the accident.7
The reason for this distinction is that the humanitarian doctrine
has as a fundamental principle the obligation of the defendant,
out of regard for human life, to use reasonable or ordinary care
to prevent the death or injury of one who is in a position of
peril.'
Thus it becomes apparent that this humanitarian doctrine is
an outgrowth or an extension of the last clear chance doctrine.
They accomplish like results in that they both absolve the plain-
tiff from the usual consequences of his contributorily negligent
acts--the only difference being that the humanitarian doctrine
extends the theory of absolution somewhat further than does the
last clear chance doctrine-i. e. in the two respects noted above.
We turn now to the decisions of the Missouri courts, in order
to determine what treatment they have accorded this unusual
gloss on the law of contributory negligence.
II. EARLY CASES UNDER THE HUMANITARIAN
DOCTRINE IN MISSOURI
A. In General.
The text writers and authors of law review notes generally
cite the case of Kellny v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Company" as
the first case decided under the humanitarian doctrine in Mis-
souri.10 Although it is true that the Kelluy case was the first to
embody all the principles of the doctrine and to speak of it as
6 Banks v. Morris (1924) 302 Mo. 254, 27 S. W. 482. Brown v. Kansas
Electric Utilities Co. (1922) 110 Kan. 283, 203 Pac. 907. Nicol v. Oregon-
Washington R. & N. Co. (1912) 71 Wash. 409, 128 Pac. 628.
7 Gibbard v. Cursan (1923) 225 Mich. 311, N. W. Indianapolis Traction
Co. v. Croly (1913) 54 Ind. App. 566. Atchinson, etc. R. R. Co. v. Bratcher
(1924) 99 Okla. 74.
9 Thompson v. Quincy, etc. Ry. Co. (1929) 322 Mo. 886, 18 S. W. (2d)
40. Banks v. Morris & Co. (1924) 302 Mo. 254, 257 S. W. 482.
9Kelley v. Mo. Pac. Railroad Co. (1890) 101 Mo. 67, 13 S. W. 806.10 The Humanitarian Rule, 64 U. S. Law Review 453.
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a generally recognized exception to the rule in regard to con-
tributory negligence, nevertheless there were earlier cases which
spoke of the "humane rule" and enunciated the general theory
or basis of the humanitarian doctrine. n - 9
The case of Ishbel v. Railroad Company~la was decided by the
Supreme Court of Missouri in 1875. That was a case where a
negligent engineer had run down a child on the track of the
defendant's railroad. The court, although seeming to apply the
last clear chance doctrine, held that the defendants should be
liable "if they could have avoided the accident by the exercise of
ordinary caution and watchfulness." This use of the word
"watchfulness" would seem to indicate that the court for the first
time is imposing liability upon a defendant when he should have
seen the plaintiff but failed to. In other words, the duty to look,
which is one of the bases of the humanitarian doctrine, is for the
first time stressed in this case.
In the case of Harlan v. St. L., K. C. & No. Railway Com-
panyllb decided in 1878 the court sets out the humanitarian doc-
trine and decides the case squarely under it, saying that a de-
fendant will be liable even though the plaintiff has negligently
placed himself in danger, "if by the exercise of reasonable care,
after a discovery by the defendant of the danger in which the
injured party stood, the accident could have been avoided, or if
the company failed to discover the danger through the reckless-
ness of its employees, when the exercise of ordinary care would
have discovered the danger and averted it."
Although the court had not yet spoken of the rule as the hu-
manitarian doctrine, it had nevertheless formulated, adopted,
applied, and affirmed the rule in the line of cases which com-
menced with Harlan v. Railway Company in 1878.
That other Supreme Court cases applied the humanitarian doc-
trine before the Kellny case is evidenced by the cases cited in the
footnote 11, c-g.
la Ishbel v. H. & St. J. R. B. Co. (1875) 60 Mo. 475.
Elib Harlan v. St. L., K. C. & No. Ry. Co. (1877) 65 Mo. 22 (1. c. 25)
1l Kelly v. Hannibal & St. Joseph B. Co. (1881) 75 Mo. 138.
rid Frick v. St. L., K. C. & No. Ry. Co. (1881) 75 Mo. 595.
lie Werner v. Citizens' By. Co. (1884) 81 Mo. 368.
lIf Donohue v. St. L., I. M. & S. B. Co. (1886) 91 Mo. 357, 2 S. W. 424,
"g Dahlstrom v. St. L. I. M. & S. B. Co. (1888) 96 Mo. 99, 8 S. W. 777.
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B. Treatment of Trespassers in Early Cases.
It would seem that at the outset the humanitarian doctrine was
intended not to apply to trespassers. The case of Williams v.
K. C. S. & M. R. Co., 12 decided in 1888, was a suit for damages
caused by the loss of plaintiff's son who was killed by the de-
fendant's train while trespassing on the defendant's tracks. The
court held that where the company has the right to anticipate a
clear track, liability of the defendant to one wrongfully on the
track cannot be predicated on the ground that the defendant's
servant should have seen the plaintiff by the exercise of ordinary
care. The court further points out that the basis of liability in
a case under the humanitarian doctrine (although the court does
not call it by that name) is a branch of the duty not to be wanton
or reckless, and that does not require the defendant to be on the
look-out for trespassers. Thus, the court takes a definite stand
against trespassers, in so far as the humanitarian doctrine is con-
cerned, and seems to exclude them from the privilege of sub-
mitting their case under that rule.8
In a case- decided by the Supreme Court of Missouri in 1891
the plaintiff submitted his cause under the humanitarian doc-
trine, and judgment for him was affirmed. The court, however,
placed much emphasis on the point that the deceased and others
were on the defendant's track by tacit permission and, therefore,
were not trespassers. The inference obviously is that had the
deceased been a trespasser on the defndant's proprty, the plain-
tiff could not have invoked the humanitarian rule.
In 1892,15 the court cited with approval the Williams case and
made much of the fact that the plaintiff was on the defendant's
track on his way to work at the direction of the defendant's fore-
man and therefore was not a trespasser. The court felt that in
the case of a trespasser there would be some question as to the
applicability of the humanitarian doctrine. It is only, however,
in the cases where the defendant calls attention to the fact that
the plaintiff was a trespasser that the matter is discussed. In
most of the cases it does not appear whether the plaintiff was
a trespasser or not. Nevertheless the policy of the court as set
12 (1888) 96 Mo. 275, 9 S. W. 573.
i8 Berbos v. Railway Co. (1888) 95 Mo. 50, 11 S. W. 254; Dlanki v. Rail-
way Co. (1891) 105 Mo. 645, 16 S. W. 281.
14 Guenther v. Railway Co. (1891) 108 Mo. 18, 18 S. W. 846.
26 Schelereth v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. (Mo. 1892) 19 S. W. 1134.
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out in the early cases, in regard to trespassers, is obvious-the
later holdings of the Supreme Court of Missouri involving tres-
passers will be examined later.16
C. Limitation of the Doctrine to Dangerous Instrumentalities.
In the early days of the humanitarian doctrine, the Supreme
Court confined its application to cases where the negligent plain-
tiff was injured by one negligently operating dangerous instru-
mentalities. The court felt that as a matter of public policy an
extra duty to be on the lookout for persons in positions of peril
should be imposed upon the operators of such dangerous instru-
mentalities. That is to say, the duty owed by the operator of a
dangerous machine was owing not only to the person who might
be injured but to society also.1" Another case proceeded on recog-
nition of the fact that a locomotive is an instrument of danger
to those who happen to be on the track when the wheels are in
motion.18
The fact that all of the early decisions in Missouri under the
humanitarian doctrin where railroad cases would seem to lend
weight to the theory that the rule originally was intended to
apply to those operating dangerous machines;"o and, as indicated
by the case last cited, by "dangerous machines" was meant rail-
road trains. The court lost no time, however, in extending the
scope of the rule beyond railroads to include accidents on street
cars.20 From street cars the court extended the doctrine to vir-
tually everything that moved, and to some things that did not.
It is obvious from a reading of these early decisions that the
original intention was to confine the doctrine to those cases where
a railroad company was the defendant.
D. Contrast Between City and Country Cases.
Some of the very earliest decisions of the Missouri Supreme
Court applying the humanitarian doctrine pointed out that the
wisdom of the rule was apparent because of the danger attending
the running of trains in large and populous cities.22
16 Infra: Part III B.
17 Czezewzha v. Benton-Bell. Ry. Co. (1893) 121 Mo. 201, 25 S. W. 911.
28 Kelly v. Union By. F. Co. (1888) 95 Mo. 279, 8 S. W. 420.
19 Hanlon v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. (1891) 104 Mo. 381, 16 S. W. 233.2 0 Werner v. Citizens' Ry. Co. (1884) 81 Mo. 368; Klockenbrinck v. St.
L. & M. R. Co. (1903) 172 Mo. 678, 72 S. W. 900.
2 Werner v Citizens' Ry. Co. (1884) 81 Mo. 368; Schelereth v. Mo. Pac.
Ry. Co. (Mo. 1892) 19 S. W. 1134. The court says: "A recognized rule of
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol20/iss2/1
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The court does not say so specifically, but these cases would
seem to indicate that this reason for the rule would not obtain in
rural sections where the engineer has a right to expect a clear
track. Indeed in cases which have arisen in the country where
the engineer had the right to expect a clear track, the liability of
the defendant railroad has been limited in such cases to negli-
gence or want of ordinary care, occuring after the exposed and
dangerous position of the injured party came to the knowledge
of the servants charged with the want of care.2 2 The holding in
these cases certainly indicates that the doctrine was never in-
tended to apply generally but only in those cases where public
policy and the interests of humanity would be better served by
application of the rule. Further proof is found in the fact that
most of the early cases involving the humanitarian doctrine in
Missouri were railroad or street car cases arising in large cities
such as St. Louis and Kansas City.23
Another point of interest which is worthy of notice is that in
most of the cases cited below the particular act of negligence of
which the defendant was guilty was the violation of a city ordi-
nance2 ' or a state statute.
2 5
The policy of these early cases was based on the premise that
persons operating dangerous instrumentalities in places gener-
law, founded upon principles of humanity requires those running engines
and trains in populous cities to exercise reasonable care to discover and
avoid injuring those, at least, who may be upon the track by right or
license."
22 Dunkman v. Wabash Ry. Co. (1887) 95 Mo. 232, 4 S. W. 670; Yarnall
v. Railway Co. (1882) 75 Mo. 583; Maher v. Ry. Co. (1876) 64 Mo. 267.
28 Kelly v. H. & S. J. R. Co. (1881) 75 Mo. 138; Frick v. Railway Co.
(1882) 75 Mo. 595; Werner v. Railway Co., note 21 supra; Donohue v.
Railway Co. (1886) 91 Mo. 357, 2 S. W. 424; Jennings v. Railway Co.(1889) 99 Mo. 394, 11 S. W. 999; Kellny v. Railway Co. (1890) 101 Mo. 67,
13 S. W. 806; Schelereth v. Railway Co., note 21 supra; Sullivan v. Rail-
way Co. (1893) 117 Mo. 214; 23 S. W. 149; Klackenbrinck v. Railway Com-
pany (1903) 172 Mo. 678, 72 S. W. 900.
2, Violation of a city ordinance: Kelly v. Railroad Co.; Donohue v. Rail-
way Co.; Jennings v. Railway Co., Kellny v. Railway Co.; Sullivan v. Rail-
road Co.; ... all note 23 supra.
25 Lloyd v. St. L. etc. Ry. Co. (1895) 128 Mo. 595, 29 S. W. 153. It was
proved that the defendant had violated a Missouri statute which imposed
liability upon railroads for failure to have a signal at their crossings.
R. S. Mo. (1889) see. 2608. Supreme Court of Mo. held that the violation
warrants a finding for the plaintiff, notwithstanding his negligence where
(as here) it appears that obedience to the statute would have prevented
the injury, and the case may be submitted to the jury under the humani-
tarian doctrine. Affirmed on rehearing in bane, (1895) 128 Mo. 595, 31
S. W. 110.
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ally used by pedestrians owed the duty to discover such persons
when in danger and to avoid injuring them if that could be done
by the exercise of ordinary care. The duty was owed to society
as well as to the individual in the position of danger.
III. THE HUMANITARIAN DOCTRINE AS IT EXISTS TODAY
A. Banks v. Morris & Company.
Probably the most important case on the subject of the hu-
manitarian doctrine ever decided by the Supreme Court of Mis-
souri is the case of Banks v. Morris & Company.20 The opinion
was written by Justice Ragland in 1923. The proposition of law
which the decision established is, in a word, that a plaintiff need
not allege in the petition that he was oblivious of peril and that
the defendant knew it. Although this holding has been followed
and approved by all subsequent cases, the decision is also im-
portant for an additional reason.
During the course of the opinion Justice Ragland set out the
elements essential to a cause of action under the humanitarian
rule. His exact words follow:
"The constructive facts of a cause of action under the
humanitarian rule, stated in their simplest terms, without
any refinements, limitations, or exceptions which might arise
on a particular state of facts, are contained in this formula:
(1) Plaintiff was in a position of peril; (2) Defendant had
notice thereof (if it was the duty of the defendant to have
been on the lookout, constructive notice suffices) ; (3) the
defendant after receiving such notice had the present ability,
with the means at hand, to have averted the impending in-
jury without injury to himself or others; (4) the defendant
failed to exercise ordinary care to avert such impending in-
jury; and (5) by reason thereof the plaintiff was injured.
Evidence tending to prove these facts makes a prima facie
case for the plaintiff."
This "formula" enunciated by Justice Ragland has been cited
and followed by subsequent cases up to the present time. 7 The
constitutive facts set out in Banks v. Morris & Co. necessary to
bring a cause of action under the humanitarian rule have never
20 (1923) 302 Mo. 254, 257 S. W. 482.
27 Suegel v. Wells (Mo. App. 1926) 287 S. W. 775; Bode v. Wells (1929)
322 Mo. 386, 15 S. W. (2d) 335; Huckleberry v. Railroad Co. (1930) 324
Mo. 1025, 26 S. W. (2d) 980; Phillips v. Henson (1930) 326 Mo. 282, 30
S. W. (2d) 1065.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol20/iss2/1
HUMANITARIAN DOCTRINE IN MISSOURI
been deviated from in any case. That case settled the law in
Missouri as far as any dispute over the essential elements of the
humanitarian doctrine was concerned.
There are, however, four situations that arise in the cases
which would seem worthy of note. They are: (1) the applicabil-
ity of the humanitarian doctrine where the plaintiff is a tres-
passer; (2) the danger zone; (3) antecedent negligence of the
defendant; and (4) the degree of care requird of motorists.
These situations will now be discussed in the order named.
B. Applicability of the Humanitarian Doctrine to Trespassers.
In an earlier part of this paper the cases involving trespassers
who sought to submit their cases under the humanitarian doc-
trine were set out.28 By 1892 the general rule seemed to have
been established to the effect that the humanitarian doctrine did
not apply in those cases where the plaintiff was a trespasser on
the defendant's property.29 The reason for this position is that
an engineer or other agent of a defendant is not bound to foresee
the wrongful presence of persons upon the track, and therefore
a court cannot impute vision of the trespasser to them, as is done
in cases where the humanitarian doctrine is applied.30 In the
case last cited it appeared that the defendant company had built
fences, posted warnings, and had generally done everything pos-
sible to keep trespassers off their tracks. The court held that
under these circumstances the defendant was entitled to expect
a clear track, and therefore it owed the plaintiff no duty to be
on the lookout for him; and since "should have seen" cannot be
said, the humanitarian doctrine cannot be applied.
In time a modifying gloss was added to the rule. The court
has held that where the evidence establishes a custom of walking
on the tracks, then the trespasser is at liberty to invoke the hu-
manitarian doctrine.3 1 The reason for this gloss is that because
of the custom (of which the defendant company must have
known) the defendant is not entitled to expect a clear track, and
hence the defendant can be held liable for negligently failing to
see the plaintiff when he would have done so if ordinary care had
L8 See Part II, section B.
LB Schelereth v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., note 21 above.
3o Frye v. St. L., etc. Ry. Co. (1906) 200 Mo. 377, 48 S. W. 566.
L' Morgan v. Wabash Railroad Co. (1900) 159 Mo. 262, 60 S. W. 195;
Fearous v. K. C. El. Ry. Co. (1903) 180 Mo. 208, 79 S. W. 394; Everett v.
St. L. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1908) 214 Mo. 54, 112 S. W. 486.
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been exercised.3 2 The rule simply stated is that the railroad com-
pany waives its right to a clear track when it knew of and ac-
quiesced in a use of the track by pedestrians.3 3 Of course, even
in the case of a trespasser a duty arises on the part of the engi-
neer to exercise ordinary care to avoid injuring the trespasser
after he has actually been discovered.3 4  Indeed in the case of
Feidler v. Railroad Company-5 the court says: "This humane rule
of law applies even to a trespasser in case the perilous situation
in which he has placed himself is discovered by the engineer in
time to prevent injury to him."
It would be more accurate to say that after the plaintiff is
actually discovered in a position of peril by the defendant, the
last clear chance doctrine applies. That is, the defendant under
such circumstances must exercise ordinary care to avoid injur-
ing the plaintiff, else his failure to do so will be considered the
proximate cause of the accident, and the plaintiff's negligence in
getting into the position of peril will not bar his recovery. This,
however, is a sharp distinction and of little utility, because, as
was pointed out in the introduction to this paper, the humani-
tarian doctrine includes within it the doctrine of the last clear
chance.
C. The Danger Zone.
One of the constitutive facts of a cause of action under the
humanitarian rule set out by Justice Ragland in the case of
Banks v. Morris & Co.35 is that the plaintiff must be in a possi-
tion of peril. In fact the position of peril of the plaintiff might
be denominated the chief element of liability.36
Most of the cases refer to the "danger zone" in deciding
whether or not the plaintiff was in a "position of peril." The
two terms are used synonymously.
An early case held that the "position of peril" was reached
when the plaintiff stepped upon the railroad track.37 In the case
32 Supra note 31.
33 Crossno v. Terminal RR. Ass'n. (1933) 333 Mo. 733, 62 S. W. (2d)
1092.
34 Morgan v. Wabash Railroad Co. (1900) 159 Mo. 262, 60 S. W. 195;
Scullin v. Wabash Railroad Co. (1904) 184 Mo. 695, 83 S. W. 760.
35 Feidler v. Railroad Co. (1891) 107 Mo. 645, 18 S. W. 847.35 Banks v. Morris & Co., note 26 above.36 State ex. rel. v. Trimble (1923) 300 Mo. 92 253 S. W. 1014; Thompson
v. Quincy, etc. R. Co. (Mo. 1929) 18 S. W. (2d) 401.
37 Boyd v. Wabash R. Co. (1891) 105 Mo. 371, 16 S. W. 909.
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of Koonty v. Wabash Railroad Company.38 the court held that if
a person approaching the track has knowledge of the approach-
ing train and he so acts as to let the engineer know he has knowl-
edge of it he is not in the "danger zone" until the track is prac-
tically reached by him. The court, however, holds that this is
not the case when the plaintiff does not know of the approaching
train; in such case the "danger zone" extends beyond the track.39
Some decisions have even attempted to locate the "danger
zone" with reference to the number of feet from the track.40
Justice White in his separate concurring opinion in Banks v.
Morris & Co. stated the rule in regard to the "position of peril"
in the best manner noted. It was his thought that "imminent
peril" means that a situation has arisen where the ordinary and
natural efforts to be expected of a person in such a position
would not put him in a place of safety. The question as to when
or where this situation arose is one of fact to be decided by the
jury after hearing the evidence. Hence, no set rules should be
laid down for the establishment of a "danger zone"; for the rea-
son that the extent of such a zone is dependent upon the factual
set-up of the particular case. This is in regard to adult plain-
tiffs injured by railroads or street cars and attempting to bring
their cases under the humanitarian rule.
In the case of a child, however, the case is somewhat different;
as the motorman and engineer cannot rely upon the child's get-
ting out of the path of the car. For example, while the "danger
zone" for adults may be the tracks, for a child of four years of
age the zone is much larger, and the duty of the operator to
exercise ordinary care begins some time earlier, before the child
reaches the tracks. 4' In the case of Livingston v. Wabash Rail-
road Company42 the court held reversible error an instruction
which ignored the duty of an engineer to see a child and com-
38 (Mo. App. 1923) 253 S. W. 413; case cited and followed in State ex.
rel. v. Trimble (Mo. 1924) 260 S. W. 1000.
39 Accord: State ex. rel. v. Reynolds (1921) 289 Mo. 479, 233 S. W. 219.
40 Keele v. A. & S. F. R. Co. (1914) 258 Mo. 62, 167 S. W. 433 "Danger
zone" is three steps from the track at the most." McGowan v. Wells (1929)
324 Mo. 652, 24 S. W. (2d) 633. The plaintiff did not enter the "danger
zone" until he took the last step or so before going into the course that the
car would take.
41 Cytron v. Transit Co. (1907) 205 Mo. 692, 104 S. W. 117 (1. c.)
Cornonski v. Transit Co. (1907) 207 Mo. 263, 106 S. W. 51.
42 (1902) 170 Mo. 452 71 S. W. 136.
Washington University Open Scholarship
ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
mence the exercise of ordinary care to avoid injury to the child
until it was actually on the track.
Here again the special facts surrounding circumstances of the
particular case are the criteria for determining when the plain-
tiff enters the "danger zone" or "position of peril", but it can
safely be said that in the case of infants the extent of the "danger
zone" is greater than in the case of adults.
In the case of Bobas v. Krey Packing Company 3 the plaintiff
was injured while climbing on to the defendant's truck. The
defendant argued that the plaintiff was not in a position of peril
and that, therefore, the humanitarian doctrine could not apply.
The court, however, held that while the position of the plaintiff
with reference to the truck's standing still, or moving slowly,
was a comparatively safe one, yet "with reference to the truck's
being suddenly and violently started forward, it was extremely
perilous." So, also, where the plaintiff was burned when gaso-
line spilled from the defendant's train along its right of way was
ignited by the sudden starting of the defendant's engine, it was
held that, while there was no fire the plaintiff was in a compara-
tively safe position; yet in the presence of the fire it became
extremely perilous.4"
The two cases point out that the "danger zone" is sometimes
established by the act of the defendant, and although the act of
the defendant creating the "danger zone" and the act of negli-
gence rendering the defendant liable are one and the same, never-
theless the humanitarian doctrine applied.
In a case where the plaintiff was run down by the defendant's
automobile while attempting to cross the street, the court held
that the plaintiff's peril arose as soon as it became apparent that
he was going to cross an intersection without stopping.45 Hence,
the defendant was bound to exercise the requisite degree of care
from that time. Since he did not, he was liable under the hu-
manitarian doctrine.
It has also been held that where a person is apparently walking
across a street his position of peril becomes imminent to the
43 (1927) 317 Mo. 108, 296 S. W. 157.
44Huckleberry v. Railroad Co. (1930) 324 Mo. 1025, 26 S. W. (2d) 980.
4"Phillips v. Henson (1930) 326 Mo. 282, 30 S. W. (2d) 1065. Here the
defendant was driving east and the plaintiff was driving west, on the same
street. At an intersection with a north and south street, the defendant sud-
denly made a left turn.
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driver when he leaves the curb-not when he reaches the middle
of the street.46 The court also held that the "danger zone" was
not limited to such narrow confines as the last step into the path
of the automobile.47
Thus it is seen that the extent of the "danger zone", as far as
automobiles are concerned is somewhat greater than in the cases
involving railroads or street railways. The reason for this may
be found in the fact that a Missouri statute48 exacts the "highest
degree of care" of the operators of motor vehicles. 49 It is sub-
mitted, however, that the real reason is found in the fact that
automobiles are for the most part driven in places where pedes-
trians or other automobiles usually are and have a right to be,
whereas railroads and street cars, moving as they do on tracks,
in most cases have the right of way, and the operators thereof
can usually presume that persons will stay off the tracks when
they see or hear a car approaching. Of course, they will do the
same in the case of automobiles, but the pedestrian knows that
automobiles can be stopped more quickly, and therefore he will
take greater chances than in cases where railroads or street rail-
ways are concerned. For this reason, the driver of a motor ve-
hicle does not have the same expectation of a clear course that
the engineer of a railroad train, or the motorman of a street car
has, and therefore the "danger zone" is essentially broader in
the case of the former than the latter.
D. Antecedent Negligence on the Part of the Defendant.
In a case49 decided by the Kansas City Court of Appeals, the
following instruction to the jury was affirmed :--"The law
is that although the motorman (of the defendant's car) could
not avoid the injury by the use of ordinary care after he saw or
by the exercise of ordinary care could have seen the plaintiff in
a position of peril on the track, the defendant is nevertheless
liable if the motorman's inability to avoid the injury was caused
by his negligence before the peril arose."
4" Gray v. Columbia Term. Co. (1932) 331 Mo. 73 52 S. W. (2d) 809.
47 Cf. Burke v. Pappas (1927) 316 Mo. 1235, 293 S. W. 142; Hornbuckle
v. McCarty (1922) 295 Mo. 162, 243 S. W. 327, 25 S. L. R. 1508; Rowe v.
Hammond (1913) 172 Mo. App. 203, 157 S. W. 880.
48 R. S. Mo. (1929) Sec. 7775.
40 Martin v. Fehse (1932) 331 Mo. 861 55 S. W. (2d) 440.
49 Murphy v. Fleming & Wilson, Receivers. (Apparently there is no re-
port of this case.
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In other words, the jury was instructed that the defendant
was liable for its antecedent negligence. The defendant receivers
brought the case to the Supreme Court of Missouri by writ of
certiorari, as a result of which the judgment of the Court of
Appeals was quashed.50
In quashing the judgment the court held that it directly con-
travened the case of Sullivan v. Railroad Company'1 in which
case it was pointed out that if the defendant were held liable for
his antecedent negligence, the result would be to abrograte the
entire doctrine of contributory negligence. The Court in the
Sullivan case also pointed out that the emanation of this doctrine
of antecedent negligence was from the unfortunate and redun-
dant dicta contained in earlier cases.52
The real error is that this rule of liability for antecedent neg-
ligence as it appeared in the two last mentioned cases was ap-
plied only to cases arising in the country where, at that time, the
humanitarian doctrine was not applied at all, but rather the doc-
trine of the last clear chance.53 At any rate there was no doubt
from the decision in the Fleming case that any rule as to the
antecedent negligence on the part of the defendant is no longer
in effect; for at the end of the opinion the court cited several
Court of Appeals cases54 which took into consideration the ante-
cedent negligence of the defendant in cases submitted under the
humanitarian doctrine, and specifically over-ruled them."
The Bland case has ever since been cited for the proposition
that prior or antecedent negligence on the part of the defendant
cannot be considered under the humanitarian doctrine.50
Indeed the law is that the prior or antecedent negligence of
50 State ex. rel. Fleming v. Bland (1929) 322 Mo. 565, 15 S. W. (2d) 798.
51 Sullivan v. Railroad Company (1893) 117 Mo. 214, 23 S. W. 149.
52 Maher v. Railroad (1876) 64 Mo. 267 (1. c. 276). The court, after
deciding that if after discovery of the plaintiff it was impossible to avoid
the accident, the defendant could not be held liable, "unless (defendant was)
guilty of negligence before, which created the impossibility. This holding
was affirmed in Dunkman v. Wabash Railway Company (1888) 95 Mo. 232,
4 S. W. 670, 1. c. 674.
53 See Part II, sec. D.54 Ruenzi v. Payne (1921) 208 Mq. App. 113, 231 S. W. 294; Goben v.
Railroad Co. (1920) 206 Mo. App. 5, 226 S. W. 631; Williams v. Railroad
Co. (1910) 149 Mo. App. 489, 131 S. W. 115; Murrell v. Railroad Co. (1903)
105 Mo. App. 88, 79 S. W. 505.
515 Bland case, note 50 above. 322 Mo. 565, 15 S. W. (2d) 1. c. 801.
56 Alexander v. St. L., etc. Railroad Co. (1931) 327 Mo. 1012, 38 S. W.
(2d) 1023; Freeman v. Berberich (1933) 332 Mo. 831, 60 S. W. (2d) 393.
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neither the plaintiff nor the defendant enters into the humani-
tarian doctrine; the humanitarian rule, when applicable, blots
out all that preceded and measures the defendant's liability solely
on its ability and failure to avoid the accident under the existing
circumstances ;-that is from the time of the discovery of the
plaintiff or when the duty to discover him arose.57 Further, it
is reversible error to submit instructions as to primary negli-
gence under the humanitarian doctrine together, unless they are
carefully distinguished.58 The cases do hold, however, that the
plaintiff may have his cause submitted under the humanitarian
doctrine and also under the theory that the defendant is liable
for primary negligence, 9 but the important point is that the two
theories must be kept separate; so as not to mislead or confuse
the jury.
It should be pointed out that while the cases do say that all
prior or antecedent negligence vanishes where the humanitarian
doctrine applies, this does not militate against the plaintiff's re-
covery on the ground of the defendant's primary negligence, in
the event the jury find that the facts are not such as will support
a case under the humanitarian doctrine. The only duty imposed
upon the trial court is to see that instructions on the two theories
are kept separate and distinct.
It would seem that this requirement is reasonable; for as Com-
missioner Sturgis remarked in commenting on the necessity of
clear instructions upon the humanitarian rule:60
"While most lawyers kmow something of the limitations of
this (humanitarian) rule and what facts the jury must find
in order to find for the plaintiff thereunder, a jury of laymen
could no more understand the rule itself or how to apply it
to the facts in evidence than they do about extracting the
cube root of a number in five figures, or perhaps applying
'Einstein's theory of relativity', whatever that may be."
The advisability of such separation is not questionable.
57 Gray v. Columbia Terminations Company (1932) 331 Mo. 73, 52 S. W.(2d) 809.
58 Freeman v. Berberich (1933) 332 Mo. 831, 60 S. W. (2d) 393; Wolfson
v. Cohen (McI Sup. 1932) 55 S. W. (2d) 677; Klockner v. Pub. Service Co.
(1932) 331 Mo. 396, 53 S. W. (2d) 1043.
59 Huckleberry v. Railroad Co. (1930) 324 Mo. 1025, 26 S. W. (2d) 980;
Freeman v. Berberich, note 58 above.
so Iman v. Freund Bread Co. (1933) 332 Mo. 461, 58 S. W. (2d) 477,
1. c. 481.
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E. The Degree of Care Required of Motorists.
A statute of Missouri- requires that operators of motor ve-
hicles shall exercise the highest degree of care while driving on
the highways of Missouri. So it has been held that in determin-
ing whether the operator of a motor vehicle was guilty of negli-
gence under the humanitarian rule, it is held that the motorist
must have exercised the highest degree of care, rather than ordi-
nary care, as is the usual case.6 2 More specifically the law is that
the driver of an automobile is liable if he saw, or if by the exer-
cise of the highest degree of care could have seen the plaintiff,
and then failed to use all available means at hand to avoid the
injury, such as sounding his horn, swerving to one side, or stop-
ping.63
It has been noted already how this higher degree of care en-
larges the "danger zone" in regard to automobile cases arising
under the humanitarian doctrine. 4 In other respects the treat-
ment of cases involving the humanitarian doctrine, where the
defendant is an operator of a motor vehicle is the same as applied
in cases involving the railroads and street railways.
IV. CONCLUSION
There has been much dispute over the advisability of extend-
ing the humanitarian doctrine so far as it has been extended by
the Supreme Court of Missouri. One writer remarked that it
actually placed a premium'on negligence on the part of pedestri-
ans. This is very good in theory but it would seem doubtful that
anyone ever acted negligently in reliance upon the protection of
the humanitarian doctrine. Most laymen know nothing of the
doctrine; so the statement that they contemplate it when acting
negligently can hardly be based in fact.
The humanitarian doctrine, as was stressed in the discussion
of the early cases, was never intended to apply to all the situa-
tions to which it has been applied. Judicial interpretation, how-
ever, has extended the doctrine even beyond the realms of danger-
ous instrumentalities and public policy.
61 R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 7775.
62 Rowe v. Hammond (1913) 172 Mo. App. 203, 157 S. W. 880; Martin v.
Fehse (1932) 331 Mo. 861, 55 S. W. (2d) 440.
63Martin v. Febse, note 62 above.
64 Cf. Part III, sec. C.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol20/iss2/1
HUMANITARIAN DOCTRINE IN MISSOURI 129
In any case, criticism of the doctrine as a judicial enunciation
is of little avail. The humanitarian rule is so firmly established
in Missouri case law that the only means by which a change could
be effected in its application is through legislative enactment.
If and when such legislation is enacted the doctrine should be
limited to cases involving large corporations operating danger-
ous instrumentalities. In a word, the public policy back of the
doctrine as first interpreted should bound it-as the humani-
tarian rule exists today it is a very convenient method of getting
judgment for the plaintiff in almost any damage suit, regardless
of his contributory negligence. It is submitted that the length
to which the Missouri courts have gone in their interpretation
of this rule is, in reality, contrary to public policy. This inter-
pretation should be reformed by appropriate legislation.
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